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Introduction
Manufacturers in a variety of markets often impose contractual restraints
on retail firms that distribute their products. Sometimes the vertical re-
straints sets a minimum or maximum retail price for the manufacturer’s
product, sometimes a manufacturer grants a retailer the exclusive right
to sell in a certain territory, sometimes it requires the distributor to sell
a certain minimum quantity over a given period of time, etc. Verti-
cal restraints occur for many types of products and in markets with a
wide variety of structures. they have been imposed by manufacturers
of medicines, automobiles, books, electronic gadgets, and many other
products. Traditionally, vertical restraints have been interpreted either
as a device of market power or as an instrument of correcting failure
in the market for distribution services. empirical evidences suggest that
these explanations are in fact of limited applicability. As a result, re-
cent works put forth new explanations for vertical restraints, still many
important aspects of vertical restraints are poorly understood. The aim
of this thesis is to shed light on a few of those aspects. Using game
theoretical framework the chapters in this thesis contribute to a better
understanding of vertical restraints.
Price restrictions are undoubtedly among those practices that are
more severely treated by antitrust authorities than any other vertical
restraint, however there is a trend towards a more flexible attitude. Yet,
retail price maintenance (RPM) and price floors are often considered
per se illegal. In the first chapter we revisit the topic of retail price
maintenance (RPM). In the current literature many motives of the RPM
has been analyzed, including the notion to support (either upstream or
downstream) collusive arguments, to induce dealer’s services or to reduce
some types of dealers risk. Our analysis emphasizes an other possible
explanation for the use of RPM. In the form of price floor, We show that
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a vertical restriction on retail price enables the manufacturer to preclude
the emergence of a collusion between retailers.
Chapter 2 considers the impact of vertical restraints on foreclosure.
In a simple model we show that foreclosure is not only attempted by
setting high prices for the use of infrastructure, but also by the strategic
behavior that is aimed at the implementation of inferior technologies in
a way that restricts or hampers access to bottleneck facilities to entrant
companies. Our analyses shows that regulators seeking to avoid market
foreclosure might trigger technological foreclosure.
The practice of exclusive contracts has been a subject of interest in
the recent literature, though most of the articles study such contracting
situations suggesting triangle structures (monopolistic player on one side
and duopolistic agents on the other side). While these results have gen-
erated important insights about the nature of such contracting games,
it is fair to say that the analysis of exclusive contracts in bilaterally
oligopolistic markets has been largely ignored in the literature and less
is known about the consequences in set-ups where both the upstream
and the downstream market contain more then one player. The analy-
sis in Chapter 3 focuses on the strategic decision as whether exclusive
contracts are profitable in a bilaterally duopolistic setting or not. We
analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively with retailers
in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by man-
ufacturers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are
shown to generate higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who
thus have an incentive to insist on exclusive contracting. However, if the
products are close substitutes no exclusivity will emerge in equilibrium.
In Chapter 4 we generalize these findings for the case of general demand
curves.
In Chapter 5 In we develop a simple model to analyze the effects of
exclusive contracts in vertically integrated markets where both the up-
stream and the downstream market are characterized as oligopolies and
manufacturers produce vertically differentiated products. We find that
firms prefer to deal exclusively with retailers. If the extent of consumers’
heterogeneity is small, manufacturers offer exclusive contracts unilater-
ally. On the other hand, if consumers’ valuation differ significantly both
manufacturers en- gage in exclusive contracting.
The last chapter investigates exclusive dealing and purchasing in suc-
cessive duopolies. First we show that using a limited set of feasible
contracts, exclusive dealing and purchasing is going to be preferred, re-
gardless of the level of product differentiation. In the next step, we make
7the choice of quality endogenous and derive the equilibrium conditions
for qualities under the aforementioned contractual arrangement. Our
final proposition shows that in this case the choice of quality depends
exclusively on the valuation of the median consumer.
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Chapter 1
The Role of Price Floor
in a Differentiated Product
Retail Market
Barna Bakó (2010), ’The Role of Price Floor in a Differentiated Product
Retail Market’, Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 40, No. 3,
363-368.
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Chapter 2
Technological Foreclosure
In this chapter we consider the impact of vertical restraints on foreclosure.
In a simple model we show that foreclosure is not only attempted by
setting high prices for the use of infrastructure, but also by the strategic
behavior that is aimed at the implementation of inferior technologies in
a way that restricts or hampers access to bottleneck facilities to entrant
companies. We reconsider Sadowski and Straathof (2005) model, but
instead of assuming firms to compete in Cournot fashion we analyze the
case when producers make their decisions in an observable and successive
manner. Our analyses shows that regulators seeking to avoid market
foreclosure might trigger technological foreclosure.
2.1 The Model
Consider an industry in which two firms compete in Stackelberg fashion.
Suppose that firm I is a monopolist in an upstream market and as a
leader firm competes with firm E in the downstream market. The cost
to produce an intermediate good is k, which can be transformed without
any cost to a final good.
Without intervention of the regulator, firm I refuses to supply the
upstream market good to firm E, which leads to market foreclosure of
the follower. In order to prevent this the regulator can impose a price
celling c, such that firm E enters the downstream market and produces
identical product with its competitor.
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The demand for the final good is given by
p(qI , qE) = α− β(qI + qE) (2.1)
The profits can be written as:
piI = p(qI , qE)qI + cqE − k(qI + qE)−m (2.2)
piE = p(qI , qE)qE − cqE − e (2.3)
where m is the cost of switching to a new technology, while e denotes the
entry cost.
We consider three different scenarios. In the first, firms compete in a
regulated Stackelberg duopoly, in which a regulator sets a price celling for
the intermediate good. In the second case we consider market foreclosure,
and as a third scenario we analyze the technological foreclosure.
2.1.1 Regulated duopoly
Suppose that the regulator imposes a price celling c that allows firm E
to enter to the market. Then, by maximizing the profit function given
by (2.3) yields that in equilibrium qE = α−c2β − qI2 . Substituting this into
the profit function of firm I, the first order condition yields
q∗I =
α− k
2β
, q∗E =
α− 2c+ k
4β
(2.4)
Hence, in equilibrium:
pi∗I =
(α+ 2c+ k)(α− k)
8β
+
(α− 2c+ k)c
4β
−
(3α− 2c− k)k
4β
−m (2.5)
pi∗E =
(α− 2c+ k)2
16β
− e (2.6)
p∗ =
α+ 2c+ k
4
(2.7)
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2.1.2 Market foreclosure
Without a price celling, the upstream firm can achieve market foreclosure.
In this case the equilibrium values are as follows
q∗I =
α− k
2β
(2.8)
pi∗M =
(α− k)2
4β
−m (2.9)
p∗ =
α+ k
2
(2.10)
2.1.3 Technological foreclosure
Now suppose that the firm I has the possibility to choose between two
upstream technologies, A and B. If firm I chooses type A, the entrant
firm can start producing final goods without high up-front investment.
By choosing technology B the firm E can enter the market only with
high entry costs. We denote the cost of entry in the case of type A as eA,
while eB denotes the entry cost in the case technology is type B, with
eA < eB . The incumbent firm fix cost are mi if it chooses technology of
type i (where i = A,B). We suppose that mA < mB , otherwise firm I
would always chooseB. Without price celling firm I choose technology A.
If the regulator interfere and imposing a price celling, than the incumbent
might prefer to choose the more costly technology to prevent entry. Too
see this consider the following. Firm E always enters if
piE(T, c) =
(α− 2c+ k)2
16β
− eT > 0, where T = A,B. (2.11)
That is, the highest c compatible with duopoly is
cE(T ) =
α+ k − 4√βeT
2
, T = A,B. (2.12)
where cE(T ) is the highest intermediate price for which firm E enters and
firm I chooses technology T . One can easily see that cE(A) is smaller
than cE(B).
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If the price celling is set such that firm E enters only if firm I chooses
technology A, than firm I might have the incentive to choose technology
B. Although, the high cost of technologyB (mB) can offset the monopoly
profit in this case.
Firm I chooses technology B if
piM (B)− piI(A, c) > 0. (2.13)
where piI(A, c) denotes the profit of firm I if the market is characterized as
duoply. Straightforward calculations gives that firm I chooses technology
B whenever c < cTF , where
cTF =
α+ k −√8β(mB −mA)
2
. (2.14)
If c > cTF than piI(A, c) > piM (B), that is firm I chooses technology
A and firm E enters the market.
Our main result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 With a price celling cTF < c < cE(A) a regulator can
prevent both market and technological foreclosure.
2.2 Summary
In this chapter we analyzed the strategical behavior of an incumbent firm
with bottleneck facilities to restrict access of potential entrant compa-
nies. We have shown that beside market foreclosure there is a threat
of technological foreclosure, when the incumbent firm chooses a technol-
ogy with the purpose to deter potential competitors from entering to
the market. We find that there exist optimal pricing strategies for the
regulator to avoid technological and market foreclosure by incumbents.
Chapter 3
Exclusive Contracts in
Bilaterally Duopolistic
Industries
Barna Bakó (2011), ’Exclusive contracts in bilaterally duopolistic in-
dustries’, Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on
Qualitative and Quantitative Economics Research, QQE 2011.
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Chapter 4
Exclusive Contracts.
A General Model1
In the previous chapter we have shown that the manufacturers will engage
in exclusive contracting when the product differentiation is strong. In this
case an exclusivity will solve the problem of contract externality. If the
products are less differentiated the manufacturers experience a prisoner’s
dilemma, where, by having an incentive to solve the externality problem,
a unilateral switch leads to a lower profit. In this case manufacturers will
offer non-exclusivity to the retailers. These results, however, rely on the
fact that the demand functions are linear. In this chapter we generalize
our findings.
4.1 The model
We consider the following vertical structure. There are two upstream
manufacturers (M1 andM2) and two downstream retailers (RA and RB).
The manufacturers face constant marginal costs ci, (i = 1, 2), the retail-
ers, in addition to the costs of obtaining the products from the manufac-
turers have a constant unit cost cj (j = A,B), which are normalized to
zero. We assume that final goods are symmetrically differentiated, and
the inverse demands for the final good i can be given by
1Paper presented at ’The 10th Annual International Industrial Organiza-
tion Conference’, March 16-18, 2012.
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pi(qi, q−i, δ) (4.1)
where i,−i = 1, 2, i 6= −i and δ ∈ (0, 1). We interpret δ as the degree
of product differentiation. For δ close to 1 downstream firms supply ho-
mogenous products, while for δ close to 0 the firms supply to independent
markets. We impose the following assumption on the demand curves:
Assumption 4.1 The demand curves are strictly decreasing, continu-
ously differentiable and intersect both axis.
The game Γ we consider is the one given in the Chapter 3.. We solve
the game by backward induction. First consider the subgame where the
manufacturers don’t commit themselves to sell exclusively for any of the
downstream players and offer a non-exclusive contract to both of the
retailers. In equilibrium q∗ij must satisfy
q∗ij = arg max
qij
(pi(qij + g
∗
i−j , q
∗
−ij + q
∗
−i−j)− ci)qij (4.2)
for every i,−i = 1, 2 (i 6= −i), j,−j = A,B (j 6= −j).
Now consider the case when manufacturer Mi, offers an exclusive
contract to the retailerRj . In this case the product of Mi is available
for purchasing only at Rj , yet the other manufacturer’s product is still
possible to buy at any retailers. In this case the profit maximization
problem boils down to
q∗ij = arg max
qij
(pi(qij + 0, q
∗
−ij + q
∗
−i−j)− ci)qij (4.3)
where i,−i = 1, 2 (i 6= −i), j,−j = A,B (j 6= −j) and q∗ij = 0 if ij = 1B.
Solving for qij (ij = 1A, 2A, 2B), and substituting them to the profit
functions yields the equilibrium values of Πe∗ij and Π∗−i.
Then, by solving the game backward, we obtain the manufacturers’
payoff in the different sub-games at stage 1 as shown in Table 4.1.
The game has several equilibria depending on the level of product
differentiation. To see this consider the followings. The equilibrium
profit of the manufacturer Mi depends on the number of retailers of
product i, which we denote by l = 1, 2, the number of retailers of prod-
uct −i 6= i, which we denote by k = 1, 2, the parameter δ and the
level of marginal costs, considered as exogenous parameters. Following
Whinston (2006) without exclusive contracts the equilibrium profits of
manufacturer Mi necessarily equals Π∗i = 2pi∗i (2, 2, δ, ci, c−i). On the
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Table 4.1: The payoff matrix
M2
no excl. excl. RA excl. RB
no excl. (Π∗1, Π∗2) (Πe∗1 , Πe∗2A) (Π
e∗
1 , Πe∗2B)
M1 excl. RA (Πe∗1A, Π
e∗
2 ) (Πee∗1A , Π
ee∗
2A ) (Π
ee∗
1A , Π
ee∗
2B )
excl. RB (Πe∗1B , Π
e∗
2 ) (Πee∗1B , Π
ee∗
2A ) (Π
ee∗
1B , Π
ee∗
2B )
other hand, if both manufacturers sign exclusive contracts, they both
have profits Πee∗ij = pi∗i (1, 1, δ, ci, c−i). If one of the manufacturers, say
Mi, signs an exclusive contract with a retailer, but M−i does not, Mi’s
profits are Πe∗ij = pi∗i (1, 2, δ, ci, c−i), if it is the other way round its profits
are Πe∗i = 2pi∗i (2, 1, δ, ci, c−i).
To ensure the existence of the equilibrium, following d’Aspremont et
al. (1979) we assume the following:
Assumption 4.2 pi∗i (l, k, δ, ci, c−i) (i = 1, 2) is strictly decreasing and
continuously differentiable in δ.
Suppose that products are completely homogenous. In this case,
following Whinston (2006) we can write
pi∗i (l, k, δ, ci, c−i) = pi
∗
i (l + k, 0, δ, ci, c−i) (4.4)
From the merger paradox (see Salant et al. (1983)). we know that
2pi∗i (3, 0, δ, ci, c−i) > pi
∗
i (2, 0, δ, ci, c−i) and 2pi∗i (4, 0, δ, ci, c−i) >
pi∗i (3, 0, δ, ci, c−i). Hence we can impose the following:
Lemma 4.1 (merger paradox assumption): Supposing homogenous prod-
ucts a firm’s profit is always higher if it sells its product without exclusive
contracts, rather than using exclusive contracts, that is, pi∗i (1, k, 1, ci, c−i) <
2pi∗i (2, k, 1, ci, c−i) for every i,−i, k = 1, 2 and i 6= −i.
With δ = 0 products are completely differentiated. As monopoly
profits should always be higher than duopoly profits, we can then use
the following:
Lemma 4.2 (competition assumption): If products are completely dif-
ferentiated a manufacturer’s profit is always higher when it sells its
product exclusively, rather than using non-exclusive contracts, that is,
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pi∗i (1, k, 0, ci, c−i) > 2pi
∗
i (2, k, 0, ci, c−i) for every k and every i,−i = 1, 2
and i 6= −i.
One key feature of the merger paradox is that for any given number
of symmetric firms in the premerger equilibrium, if the merger by a
specified number of firms causes gains (respectively, losses), a merger
by a larger (smaller) number of firms will cause gains (losses).2 Thus,
we assume that if a merger is profitable, then it is more profitable if the
other manufacturer is having less retailers.3 This is formalized with the
following
Lemma 4.3 pi∗i (1, 1, δ, c, c) − 2pi∗i (2, 1, δ, c, c) > pi∗i (1, 2, δ, c, c) −
2pi∗i (2, 2, δ, c, c) for every i = 1, 2.
The following propositions characterize the equilibrium outcomes of
the game.
Proposition 4.1 If δ is close enough to zero, that is when the product
differentiation is strong, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is when
manufacturers offer exclusive contracts to the retailers, and the retailers
accept that offer.
Proof: For exclusive contracts to be an equilibrium, we need
pi∗i (1, 2, δ, ci, c−i, ) > 2pi
∗
i (2, 2, δ, ci, c−i) (4.5)
pi∗i (1, 1, δ, ci, c−i) > 2pi
∗
i (2, 1, δ, ci, c−i) (4.6)
for every i,−i = 1, 2 (i 6= −i).
Suppose that δ = 1. The Lemma 4.1 then implies that condition
(4.5) is satisfied, however condition (4.6) is not. If we suppose δ = 0
from Lemma 4.2 we obtain that condition (4.6) holds and condition (4.5)
is violated. From Assumption 4.2 and Lemma 4.1–4.2 follows that for
every reasonable ci (c−i) there is a δi (δ−i) for which if δ ≤ δi (δ ≤ δ−i)
condition (4.5) is satisfied for every i. Respectively, for every ci (c−i)
there is a δi (δ−i) for which if δ ≤ δi (δ ≤ δ−i) condition (4.6) holds.
Then if δ ≤ δ ≡ min{δi, δ−i, δi, δ−i} the manufacturers offer exclusive
contracts to the retailers. This equilibrium is unique if Assumptions 4.1
holds.
2Salant et al. (1983) arrives to the conclusion that for a merger to be
unprofitable it is sufficient that less than 80 percent of the firms collude.
3One other way to interpret this assumption is that in average the maximum
profit of an industry composed either by a monopolist or by competitive firms
is always higher than the average profit of an oligopolistic industry.
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Proposition 4.2 If products are close substitutes the unique perfect equi-
librium when manufacturers sell their product without exclusivity and re-
tailers accept these non-exclusive contracts.
Proof: The existence of non-exclusive contracts equilibrium requires the
following two conditions to be satisfied for every i,−i = 1, 2 and i 6= −i
2pi∗i (2, 1, δ, ci, c−i, ) > pi
∗
i (1, 1, δ, ci, c−i) (4.7)
2pi∗i (2, 2, δ, ci, c−i) > pi
∗
i (1, 2, δ, ci, c−i) (4.8)
The proof is much along the same lines as the one above. If δ = 0
we know from the Lemma 4.2 that these conditions are violated, while
if δ = 1 from the Lemma 4.1 follows that they are satisfied. Thus, these
assumptions together with the Assumption 4.2 imply that for every ci, c−i
exist δi, δ−i, δi, δ−i such that for every δ ≥ δ ≡ max{δi, δ−i, δi, δ−i}
manufacturers are better off if they sell through both of the retailers
rather than offering an exclusive contracts to one of them.
The Assumption 4.1 assures that this equilibrium is unique.
It is easy to show that supposing symmetric manufacturers there is
no equilibrium in which one of the manufacturer unilaterally would offer
an exclusive contract to one of the retailers. This follows directly from
the Lemma 4.3, which contradicts the required conditions, namely
pi∗i (1, 2, δ, c, c, ) > 2pi
∗
i (2, 2, δ, c, c) (4.9)
2pi∗−i(2, 1, δ, c, c) > pi
∗
−i(1, 1, δ, c, c) (4.10)
where i 6= −i. This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Supposing symmetric manufacturers (ci = cj = c)
there is no δ for which unilateral exclusive contract would emerge in equi-
librium.
Our findings regarding the existence of asymmetric exclusive contract
equilibria crucially changes if we introduce asymmetric manufacturers.
To see this consider the following.
For asymmetric exclusive contract equilibrium we need
pi∗i (1, 2, δ, ci, c−i, ) > 2pi
∗
i (2, 2, δ, ci, c−i) (4.11)
2pi∗−i(2, 1, δ, ci, c−i) > pi
∗
−i(1, 1, δ, ci, c−i) (4.12)
where i 6= −i. If δ = 0, Lemma 4.2 implies that (4.11) holds, while (4.12)
is violated. On the other hand, if δ = 1, (4.12) is satisfied, while (4.11)
is not, using Lemma 4.1.
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For any given ci, c−i, define by δˆi(ci, c−i) the degree of product dif-
ferentiation, when manufacturer Mi is indifferent between offering an
exclusive contract to a retailer or selling its product non-exclusively, sup-
posing that the other manufacturer using non-exclusive contracts, that
is when pi∗i (1, 2, δˆi, ci, c−i, ) = 2pi∗i (2, 2, δˆi, ci, c−i). Similarly, we can
define δˆ−i(ci, c−i) as a degree of product differentiation when
2pi∗−i(2, 1, δˆ−i, ci, c−i, ) = pi
∗
−i(1, 1, δˆ−i, ci, c−i). For an asymmetric ex-
clusive contract equilibrium we need δˆi > δˆ−i to be hold for any given
(ci, c−i) pair. To assure this, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption 4.3 A low cost manufacturer is more likely to engage in
exclusive contracting, than a high cost manufacturer. that is dδ(ci,c−i)
dci
<
0 for every i,−i = 1, 2.
Our main result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 Let Γ be a game satisfying Assumptions 4.1–4.3. Sup-
posing asymmetric manufacturers (ci < cj) unilateral exclusive contract
will emerge in equilibrium, if the product differentiation is moderate, and
the low cost manufacturer will offer an exclusive contract to one of the
retailers, while the other manufacturer will sell its product offering non-
exclusive contracts to the retailers.
Chapter 5
Exclusive Contracts with
Vertically Differentiated
Products
Barna Bakó (2012), ’Exclusive contracts with vertically differentiated
products’, Economics Bulletin, 1312-1319.
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Chapter 6
Reciprocally Exclusive
Contracts and Endogenous
Quality
Papers on exclusive dealing almost exclusively (pun intended) focus on
foreclosure, possibly with vertical integration and cartelization of the
downstream market, e.g. in Chen (1999). However, the choice of dis-
tribution methods is a much more complex topic. Moner-Colonques,
Sempere-Monerris and Urbano (2004) give a detailed analysis of poten-
tial distribution setups and the influencing factors.
We intend to focus on one specific arrangement: exclusive distribu-
tion and exclusive purchasing. Here the manufacturer sells the good
through an independent single brand store which carries only their prod-
uct line. This setup is rather typical in car dealerships, but not un-
known in consumer electronics (where Apple in many countries sells only
through brand stores and Sony relies heavily on brand stores as well) or
even in Hungarian bakeries.
In line with the focus of our study, we limit the structure of pos-
sible contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Though it might
seem too restricting, this helps us find an equilibrium in pure strategies,
thus avoiding the "bumping problem" haunting models with take-it-or-
leave-it offers, mentioned by Inderst and Shaffer (2010). Though we
only show the dominance of choosing exclusive distribution and exclusive
purchasing in this limited setup, other factors might steer companies to-
wards single-brand stores. One example would be the bias in consumer
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judgements when brands are presented in isolation (see Posavac et al.
(2005)). On the other hand, we try to be more general in the field of
product and retailer differentiation. Our model presents vertically dif-
ferentiated upstream firms and a horizontally differentiated downstream
market. Besides making our model more general, it also gives a more
intuitive understanding of the decisions of the firms. As in the previous
literature, we used linear contracts to focus on the strategic element in
the choice of contracts.
Endogenous quality choice in an oligopolistic setup was discussed by
Jing (2006), although without a retail sector. Our final proposition, just
like his paper, arrives to an equilibrium condition related to consumer
valuations and the steepness of the cost curves with respect to quality.
Recently the issue of product quality has also gained emphasis in dis-
cussions of distribution policies, though the focus is still on foreclosure
as in Yehezkel (2008) and Argenton (2010). Our paper rather want to
focus on an endogenous choice of quality determined by the contractual
environment, since it might serve as a starting point for a later, more
detailed analysis of welfare effects. In a way, our findings reflect that
of Moner-Colonques, Sempere-Monerris and Urbano (2004) who con-
cluded that exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing is prevalent
when product differentiation and brand asymmetries are low. However,
while they were interested in how the characteristics of an industry might
lead to certain contractual arrangements, we want to find out how distri-
bution contracts affect quality choice which in turn determines product
differentiation and brand asymmetries.
In the next section we analyze the choice of contracts with exogenous
quality. In the third section we relax the assumption of exogenous quality
and focus on the quality choices of the manufacturers under the previous
contractual arrangement. In the final section we conclude our findings.
6.1 The Model
Consider a market in which manufacturers produce differentiated prod-
ucts and sell through retailers. Consumers are heterogenous in two di-
mensions. Each consumer has a most preferred retailer x ∈ [0, 1] and a
quality valuation y ∈ [0, 1]. A consumer of type (x, y) buying a product
of quality qi at the retailer j derives the following utility
v + qiy − t|x− xj | − pij
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where v is a positive constant common to all consumers, t > 0 is a
preference parameter and pij is the price of the ith product sold by
retailer j. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit square
[0, 1]× [0, 1] with a total mass of 1 (see Figure 6.1). A consumer who is
located at the point of coordinates (x, y) has a preferred retailer that is
x away from retailer A and 1− x away from the retailer B. We assume
that v is large enough for each consumer to find a product that leaves
her with a nonnegative surplus. We normalize t to 1. This amounts to a
monotonic transformation of preferences.
Firm A Firm B
0 1
(x,y)
1
Figure 6.1: Location of firms and consumers on the unit square.
There are two manufacturers, 1 and 2, offering a product of quality q1,
q2 and two retailers, A and B, located at the points of coordinates (0, 0)
and (1, 0), that is, the retailers have maximum horizontal differentiation.
We assume that q1 > q2 > 0. Manufacturers operate with ci marginal
costs, where c1 > c2. The retailers face no retailing costs above the costs
of obtaining the products from manufacturers.
We solve the following sequential game for subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. First, the manufacturers simultaneously decide whether to
offer a reciprocally exclusive contract to a retailer and set their whole-
sale prices, w1 and w2. These decisions become common knowledge after
they have been made. In the second stage, the retailers – after observing
the previous stage’s outcome – decide whether to accept the offer and
compete in prices while taking the other firm’s prices as given. A re-
tailer always accepts an offer when that yields him a non-negative profit.
Consumers subsequently decide which product and at which retailer to
purchase, and profits are realized.
We consider two situations. In the first case no manufacturer engages
in exclusivity and therefore both products is available at each retailer
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shop for purchasing. In the second case exclusivity prevails and each
manufacturer sells its product exclusively to its retailer. Note that, when
a manufacturer offers an exclusive contract to a retailer implies that both
manufacturers sell exclusively its products. In this setting exclusivity by
both manufacturers can be achieved if at least one manufacturer choose
to engage in exclusivity.
Finally, in this analysis we restrict our attention to the case when ev-
ery firm makes positive profits in equilibrium. To assure this we assume
that the quality difference is less then a benchmark above which all con-
sumer would prefer to buy the high quality product, yielding zero profit
for the low quality firm. Formally, we suppose the following assumption.
Assumption 6.1
c1 − c2
2
< q <
9 + c1 − c2
5
if c1 − c2 ≤ 1
c1 − c2
2
< q <
9− c1 + c2
4
if c1 − c2 > 1
where q ≡ q1 − q2
Let us first consider the case when no manufacturer commits itself to
deal exclusively with a retailer. In this case both products are available
for purchasing at any retailer. Figure 6.2 shows the division of the market
between retailers when no exclusivity occurs A consumer who is located
at the points of coordinates (x, y) will purchase the high quality rather
then the low quality product at retailer A if v + q1y − x − p1A ≥ v +
q2y− x− p2A, i.e., if she is located above the line y = p1A−p2Aq . That is,
every consumer with a quality valuation y′ > y strictly prefers to buy the
high quality rather then the low quality product at the retailer shop A.
Furthermore, this consumer prefers to buy a given quality product from
retailer A rather then from retailer B, if and only if v + qiy − x− piA ≥
v + qiy − (1 − x) − piB . This implies that consumers in the interval
x ∈ [0, 1+piB−piA
2
] will purchase from retailer A , whereas those with
x ∈ ( 1+piB−piA
2
, 1] will purchase from retailer B the product in question.
Let Dij(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) denote the demand function of product i
at retailer j. The expressions for these functions can be given as follows
D1A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1 + p1B − p1A
2
)(
1− p1A − p2A
q
)
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Firm A Firm B
0 1
1
q1A
q2B
Firm A Firm B
0 1
1
q1A
q2A
q1B
q2B
Figure 6.2: Market areas with and without exclusivity.
D1B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1− 1 + p1B − p1A
2
)(
1− p1B − p2B
q
)
D2A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1 + p2B − p2A
2
)(
p1A − p2A
q
)
D2B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) =
(
1− 1 + p2B − p2A
2
)(
p1B − p2B
q
)
Solving the game backward, first we consider the retailers’ competi-
tion. Retailers choose simultaneously (p1A, p2A) and (p1B , p2B) respec-
tively to maximize their profits,
piA = (p1A − w1)D1A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) +
(p2A − w2)D2A(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B)
and
piB = (p1B − w1)D1B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B) +
(p2B − w2)D2B(p1A, p1B , p2A, p2B)
where wi denotes the wholesale price for product i.
This yields prices equal to p∗ij = 1 + wi, where i = 1, 2 and j =
A,B. Plugging these prices into the manufacturers profit function and
maximizing them with respect to w1 and w2 respectively yields
Lemma 6.1 Suppose no manufacturer offers exclusivity to retailers. The
equilibrium prices and profits are as follows (j = A,B).
p∗1j =
1
3
(3 + 2q + 2c1 + c2), p
∗
2j =
1
3
(3 + q + c1 + 2c2)
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pi∗1 =
(2q − c1 + c2)2
9q
pi∗2 =
(q + c1 − c2)2
9q
Now suppose that manufacturer i deals exclusively with one of the
retailers. Without loss of generality we assume that the high quality
manufacturer offers an exclusive dealing to the retailer A and commits
itself not to deal with retailer B. In this case each product is available for
purchasing only at one retailer. The market is shared between retailers
as is shown by the Figure 6.2. The utilities of type (x, y) from buying a
high or a low quality product from the specific retailer can be given as
v + q1y − x− p1A and v + q2y − (1− x)− p2B . Therefore, for a given y,
the marginal consumer type in terms of x is
xˆ(y) =
1
2
(1 + qy + p2B − p1A) (6.1)
For any y ∈ [0, 1], consumers in the interval x ∈ [0, xˆ(y)] will purchase the
high quality product from retailer A, whereas those with x ∈ (xˆ(y), 1] will
purchase the low quality product from retailer B. Thus straightforward
algebra implies
D1A(p1A, p2B) =
1
2
(
1 + p2B − p1A + q
2
)
(6.2)
and
D2B(p1A, p2B) =
1
2
(
1 + p1A − p2B − q
2
)
(6.3)
The retailers’ profit maximizing first-order conditions yield the equi-
librium consumer prices p∗1A = 13
(
3 + 2w1 + w2 +
q
2
)
and p∗2B = 13 (3+
w1 + 2w2 − q2
)
. Having derived the equilibrium prices in the retailers’
pricing subgame we can move backward and analysing the manufactur-
ers maximization problem. Manufacturers choose wholesale prices that
maximize their profits. Formally this can be summarized in the following.
Lemma 6.2 If one or both manufacturer offers exclusivity the optimal
prices and profits can be given as
p∗1A =
1
9
(36 + 2q + 5c1 + 4c2) p
∗
2B =
1
9
(36− 2q + 4c1 + 5c2)
pi∗1 =
1
216
(18 + q − 2c1 + 2c2)2 pi∗2 = 1
216
(18− q + 2c1 − 2c2)2
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This is a valid solution as long as the indifference line intersects the
top and the bottom sides of the unit square, i.e., as long as xˆ(0) ∈ (0, 1)
and xˆ(1) ∈ (0, 1). Indeed,
xˆ(0) =
1
18
(9− 4q − c1 + c2) ∈ (0, 1) (6.4)
and
xˆ(1) =
1
18
(9 + 5q − c1 + c2) ∈ (0, 1) (6.5)
hold if Assumption (6.1) is satisfied.
In the contracting stage manufacturers simultaneously decide whether
to offer exclusive contracts to retailers. From Lemma (6.1) and Lemma
(6.2) it follows that
Proposition 6.1 The subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies
are the outcomes when at least one manufacturer offers an exclusive con-
tract to a retailer and that contract is accepted.
It is easy to verify why a unilateral exclusivity constitute an equilib-
rium. Consider for example the case when the high quality manufacturer
offers an exclusive contract to a retailer. In this case manufacturer 1 earns
a profit given by the Lemma (6.2). Without exclusivity the profit can be
given by the Lemma (6.1). Thus, the difference of profits is
1
216
(18 + q − 2c1 + 2c2)2 − (2q − c1 + c2)
2
9q
(6.6)
which is always strictly positive whenever Assumption (6.1) is satisfied.
Note, that the outcome when both manufacturers offer exclusivity
to a retailer is always an equilibrium in this setup, while an accepted
unilateral exclusivity always generates the same market structure as the
outcome when both manufacturer has an exclusive retailer for its prod-
uct. Furthermore, Proposition (6.1) implies that at least a manufacturer
will engage in exclusivity in equilibrium.
6.2 Quality choices
So far we assumed that the qualities chosen by the manufacturers are
fixed. As the quality difference is crucial in evaluating the equilibrium
outcomes a natural question to ask is what level of quality difference
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will emerge in equilibrium if manufacturers choose their quality as part
of the game? In this section we endogenize the manufacturers’ qualities
and we model this by assuming that firms simultaneously select their
quality prior to the contracting choice.
Assume that manufacturers operate with ci(qi) marginal cost func-
tions, where c2(q) > c1(q) > 0 for every q > 0 and ci(·) is strictly convex
and increasing in quality levels for every i = 1, 2.
As we already know from the previous section manufacturers opt to
deal exclusively with the retailers and thus gain profits given by Lemma
(6.2), where the fixed marginal costs ci (i = 1, 2) are functions of the
respective qualities. Maximizing these profit functions with respect to
quality levels, yields the following first order conditions:
1− 2c′1(q1) = 0 (6.7)
1− 2c′2(q2) = 0 (6.8)
Proposition 6.2 The marginal increase in average cost due to
quality improvement equals the average valuation of quality in the
case of both firms, ie. they optimize with respect to quality with the
"median consumer" in mind.
..
q1A
C (q )ii
C (q )11
C (q )22 *
*
   q2*    q1*
Figure 6.3: Equilibrium quality choices.
The next proposition summarizes the main results for the firms’ equi-
librium quality choices.
Proposition 6.3 In equilibrium manufacturers choose strictly positive
quality levels. The more efficient firm selects a high quality level, while
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the other manufacturer chooses a low quality status. Firms do not engage
neither in maximum nor in minimum differentiation.
Figure 6.3 helps in providing intuition for this outcome. Note that
as far as firms differ in efficiency they will choose different quality lev-
els. Furthermore, observe that the quality difference between products
increases with the difference in cost functions.
6.3 Summary
We first proposed a non-cooperative game of successive duopolies with
limited strategy choice. We have shown that exclusive purchasing and
distribution is preferred to non-exclusive purchasing and distribution
with any level of vertical product differentiation. Then we relaxed the
assumption that quality is fixed and derived the equilibrium conditions
for quality choices under exclusive purchasing and distribution. Our fi-
nal conclusion here is that under this distribution arrangement, quality
is going to be adjusted based only on the median consumer’s valuation.
This also means that vertical differentiation is going to be limited and de-
pends on the differences in the cost function with respect to quality. Our
result contradicts the earlier result of product differentiation in multi-
characteristics space, when firms choose to maximize differentiation in
the dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in the others
(see Irmen and Thisse (1998)).
Generalizations of our results could include different distribution of
consumers in the consumer space, different set of feasible contracts, or a
higher number of retailers to induce richer strategic scenarios. Further
steps taken in analyzing how the set of (legally) feasible contract affects
product quality could greatly enhance our understanding of how antitrust
policy should view certain practices (e.g. exclusive dealing).
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